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This paper provides new empirical evidence for quarterly U.S. aggregate advertising 
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Cycle. To understand this pattern we develop a general equilibrium model where 
targeted advertising increases the marginal utility of the advertised good. Advertising 
intensity is endogenously determined by profit maximizing firms. We embed this 
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monopolistic competition. We find that advertising affects the aggregate dynamics in 
a relevant way, and it exacerbates the welfare costs of fluctuations for the consumer. 
Finally, we provide estimates of our setup using Bayesian techniques. 
 
Keywords: Advertising, DSGE model, Business Cycle fluctuations, Bayesian 
estimation, habits persistence. 
 




* This paper was part of our Ph. D. theses at UPF. We are grateful to our advisors, respectively Albert 
Marcet and Jordi Galí, for their guidance during this period. Also, we wish to acknowledge useful 
talks and suggestions about this project from David Andolfatto, Alberto Bisin, Andrea Caggese, 
Pierluigi Ciocca, Fabio Canova, Timothy Kehoe and participants to the Macro Workshop at UPF, the 
Macroeconomic Workshop in Vigo, and the ASSET 2006 Conference. Finally, Albert Marcet and 
Ramon Marimon are gratefully acknowledged for the financial support provided to collect the 
database used in this paper. This database was made possible by the courtesy of the staff of Jonson 
Graduate School of Management Library (Sage Hall, Cornell University). 
** B. Molinari: Universidad Pablo de Olavide (Sevlla, Spain - EU). Contact e.mail: 
benedetto.molinari@upf.edu. F. Turino, Corresponding author: Departament de Fonaments de 
l’Análisis Económica, Universitat D’Alacant, Campus de Sant Vicent, Alacant 03080, SPAIN. 
Telephone: 34-965.903.400 (ext: 3217), Fax: 34-965.903.898. e.mail: fturino@merlin.fae.ua.es
  3"... as a matter of fact, the scale of expenditures on advertising varies positively with
the general level of economic activity, so that, insofar as the eect of marginal ex-





In 2005 rms spent 230 billions of dollars to advertise their products in U.S. media, around 1000
dollars per U.S. citizen. Advertising as an industry in U.S. is worth 2:2% of GDP, absorbs around
20% of rms' budget for new investments, and 13% of their corporate prots.1 Despite the sizeable
amount of resources that it absorbs in the economy, advertising has been traditionally analyzed in
microeconomic contexts, receiving scarce attention in macroeconomic literature. Most likely, the
reason is that advertising is commonly viewed as a selling cost2 that potentially redistributes the
demand across rms of the same industry without aecting total market size, and therefore not
playing any signicative role in macroeconomic theory.3
In this paper we take a dierent stand on this topic, arguing that advertising can have a
signicant impact on aggregate dynamics once we account for the eect that it is traditionally
supposed to have on the demand. As a matter of fact, in the microeconomic literature the rationale
of rms spending on advertising has been identied with the positive eect of advertising on
sales. Indeed, rms realize that the demand they face is not exogenously given by consumers'
preferences, but it can be tilt toward their own products through advertisements. The eectiveness
of advertising in enhancing the demand is not only revealed by rm's attitude to spend money on
it, but also supported by a large number of empirical studies.4 Overall, the positive relationship
between rm's advertising and its own demand is widely accepted as robust empirical evidence.
Building on this fact, in this paper we ask whether such relationship may hold also in the aggregate.
Since the reason of advertising is to increase consumers' demand, targeted advertising increases
the sales of a single good, would aggregate advertising enhance aggregate consumption? And, if
yes, will it also increase aggregate demand and production through consumption? Moreover, will
aggregate advertising aect other aspects of the economy?
We focus on the relationship between advertising and aggregate consumption because this
turns out to play a crucial role in order to assess the aggregate impact of advertising. As we will
show in section 4, a variation in the level of aggregate consumption due to a variation of aggregate
advertising is the main channel for advertising to propagate through the economy. If we shut down
this channel, the eect of advertising becomes negligible.
The question whether aggregate advertising is a determinant of aggregate consumption has al-
ready been posed in the literature, and a widespread opinion is that the answer should be negative.
Building on Solow (1968) and Simon (1970), macro-economists argue that it would be incorrect to
assume aggregate advertising and aggregate consumption to have the same causality relationship
1Statistics refer to 2005. Investment are xed non-residential investment (source Bureau of Economic Analysis
of U.S.). Prots are taken from The Economist (Economic and Financial Indicators).
2A selling cost is meant a cost that rms bear in order to enhance the demand, but it neither enters as a factor
in the production function, like investment in equipment and machinery, nor aects the production technology, like
R&D.
3In this perspective advertising is meant to be a combative and dissipative cost. It is interesting to note, however,
that in industrial organization literature the idea of advertising as market enhancing mechanism at industry level is
widely accepted. See for instance Friedman (1983) or Martin (1993, ch. 6).
4A survey of this studies can be found in Bagwell (2005) and Schmalensee (1972).
3that holds between targeted advertising and sales, since advertising raises rm's demand by steal-
ing customers from competitors, and not by increasing the overall size of the markets. Because
of this "competition" eect, advertising would just aect the composition, but not the size of
aggregate consumption. In the literature, however, there is also an opposite view that builds on
Galbraith (1958), who supported the enhancing eect of advertising on aggregate consumption.
As a matter of fact, several papers sought for empirical evidence to settle this debate, among
them Ashley, Granger, and Schmalensee (1980), Jacobson and Nicosia (1981), or more recently,
Jung and Seldom (1995). However, despite the large amount of empirical studies, the evidence of
positive relation between aggregate advertising and consumption is not conclusive, and after the
conjectures of those classical economists the literature still lacks of a theoretical framework where
to analyze aggregate advertising.5
In this paper we attempt to ll this gap by providing a general equilibrium model that accounts
for advertising. In particular, we assume a specication of preferences that nests the two competing
theories about aggregate advertising, i.e. advertising as market enhancing vs. spread-the demand-
around advertising. Then, we use this model to analyze the eect of advertising on aggregate
dynamics. The main result of the paper is to show that, under some conditions, advertising can
have a quantitatively relevant impact on aggregate dynamics by generating a work and spend
cycle: a consumer who wants to spend more on consumption because of the advertising incentive,
but faces the intertemporal budget constraint, will end up working more hours. Also, using the
DSGE model we precisely identify the conditions under which the responses of consumption and
labor to any of the shocks considered are larger when rms are allowed to promote their products
by incurring in advertising expenditures. As a result, advertising potentially tends to accentuate
the amplitude of the business cycle 
uctuations as suggested by Kaldor (1950). We assess the
quantitative impact of advertising on 
uctuations by measuring the welfare costs of 
uctuations
when rms are allowed to advertise against the ones of an economy where advertising is banned.
Finally, by means of a Bayesian estimation of a log-linearized version of our model, we asses which
theory of advertising is more likely to be true conditional on aggregate data. One main result of
this paper is to show that aggregate advertising does aect aggregate consumption, as originally
suggested by Galbraith (1958).
In this paper advertising is intended as a form of manipulation of consumer's preferences.6 As
in Dixit and Norman (1978) and Benhabib and Bisin (2002), we model advertising to increase
the marginal utility of the advertised good through a modication of parameters in the utility
function. Notice, however, that this assumption is not by itself a sucient condition to conclude
that aggregate advertising enhances aggregate demand. If consumers used savings to pay the
extra consumption generated by advertisements, then advertising would at the same time increase
consumption and crowd out investments, and the net eect on the demand would be unclear.
Also, if advertising shifted purchases toward more expensive goods, then an increase in advertising
could imply a reduction in real consumption, and therefore in the aggregate demand. Moreover,
advertising is not just a matter of demand, it can aect the economic activity in various ways. For
instance increasing the substitutability among goods, and therefore aecting the market power of
5There are some exceptions. Benhabib and Bisin (2002) analyze what are the conditions such that advertising
can aect the aggregate labor supply in a neoclassical general equilibrium model, and Grossmann (2007) studies the
link between advertising and in-house R&D expenditures in a quality-ladder model of endogenous Growth.
6The way to integrate advertising in consumer's choice theory is controversial. In general, there are three dierent
views in the literature about what advertising does: the Persuasive, the Informative, and the Complementary view.
See Bagwell (2005) for an excellent survey. A tastes shifter advertising as the one we model here ts in with the
Persuasive view about advertising, as originally proposed by Marshall (1890,1919), Chamberlain (1933), Robinson
(1933), Kaldor (1950), and later on used by Dixit and Norman (1978) and Benhabib and Bisin (2002).
4rms (price eects). Or, in a dynamic framework, reducing consumers savings, and hence future
demand. Overall, the general equilibrium eect of advertising on the economy does not seem
obvious. In order to cope with all the eects mentioned above, we embed our candidate utility
function with advertising into a dynamic stochastic growth model with monopolistic competition,
and we simulate it to analyze the eect of advertising in the general equilibrium solution of the
model.
In our model economy advertising aects aggregate dynamics in several ways. It absorbs re-
sources, increases rms' monopolistic power, and in equilibrium raises consumption, labor, and
output. Basically, we can identify three channels through which advertising operates on the ag-
gregate dynamics. The rst one we refer to as the work and spend cycle: in the presence of
advertising, people work more in order to aord a higher consumption path, where the perceived
need for higher consumption is due to the advertising signals agents are exposed to. In fact, in this
setup consumers' tastes are endogenous, since they depend on rms' optimal advertising policy,
and possibly vary over time. The second mechanism operates through prices. Advertising in-
creases rms' markup, therefore reducing consumer's wage and, other things equal, the quantity of
labor supplied. The third mechanism operates through the resource constraint. Since advertising
absorbs resources, it puts a wedge between gross production and net GDP, which is dened as
consumption plus investment. We show that for a reasonable set of parameter calibrations, the
rst mechanism prevails over the others. In equilibrium both labor and output increase. Then,
part of the extra production is used to produce advertising, and the rest is sold as consumption
goods.
The way we include advertising in the utility function is akin to that used in the macroeconomic
literature on consumption habits.7 Like external deep habits, advertising creates dissatisfaction in
the consumer about his actual level of consumption, pushing him to buy more. Where advertising
diers from habits is that the enhancing eect on the good demand is generated endogenously in
the equilibrium by the interaction between rms' decisions and consumers reactions, while in the
case of habits it is exogenously assumed. We stress this point because one result in our framework
is that the demand of single variety goods turns out to be function of past advertising, which
itself is function of past sales. Hence, the demand function of good i can be written as function
of past consumption of good i, as in models of customer markets or models with "deep habits"
preferences.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we characterize the cyclical behavior of quarterly
aggregate advertising expenditures. Section 3 introduces the general equilibrium model with ad-
vertising. We show that rms optimally use advertising as a complementary tool to price-setting.
As a side contribution of the paper, the dynamic version of the Dorfam-Steiner (1954) theorem is
provided. Simulation results are reported in section 4. In section 5, we analyze the welfare impli-
cations of the presence of advertising. Finally, we estimate a log-linearized version of the model to
test for the eect of advertising on aggregate consumption. The results are reported in section 6.
Conditional on our data, the market enhancing hypothesis is preferred versus the spread-it-around,
meaning that advertising does aect aggregate consumption, and through consumption, the labor
supply, the markup, and eventually the aggregate production. Section 7 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
In what follows we dene aggregate advertising as total spending borne by domestic and foreign
rms to advertise their products in U.S. media. Quarterly data of aggregate advertising are
7See Abel (1990) and Ravn Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006).































Figure 1: Advertising in Postwar U.S. economy. Panel 1. Advertising as share of GDP.
Panel 2. Per-capita real advertising. Coen's annual data, sample from 1948 to 2005.
not included among standard business cycle indicators. We collected them relying on various
sources, which are listed in Appendix A. The resulting database that we use in this paper is
therefore novel, and up to our knowledge it is the only up-to-date free-of-charge quarterly series
of U.S. aggregate advertising available in the literature.8 Our data report rms' expenditures on
advertising in 7 media, namely: cable and network televisions, radio, newspapers, magazines and
Sunday magazines, billboards, direct mails, and outdoor advertising. The sample starts in the rst
quarter of 1976 and ends the second quarter of 2006, (122 quarters).
In order to check whether the series provided in this paper is actually representative of the whole
U.S. aggregate advertising expenditures, we compute the total yearly cumulated expenditures from
our data set, and we compare them with the annual data series for total advertising expenditures
constructed by Robert Coen of Universal McCann, which is considered by advertising experts
the most reliable source of data on aggregate advertising.9 For our sample the series we built
accounts on average for nearly 30% of Coen's aggregate advertising, with a minimum of 25%, and
an in-sample standard deviation of 2:95%.
Coen's annual data are useful to assess the magnitude of the phenomenon at issue. As we
can see from panel 1 of gure (1), the ratio of advertising over GDP 
uctuates around 2.1%
throughout the sample, with a peak in the 2000. Overall, the picture shows that advertising is a
sizeable industry in the US economy. Also, panel 2 of gure (1) plots per-capita real advertising
expenditures. This statistic is commonly used in the literature as measure of the number of
advertising messages that reaches the consumer, i.e. a proxy for the intensity of advertising in the
8U.S. Federal administration used to collect quarterly data of aggregate advertising, but it stopped after 1968,
when advertising was dismissed from the list of relevant variables used by the FED to analyze the cycle.
9See Appendix A for details on the sources of data.










































Figure 2: Advertising and the main Business Cycle Indicators. Quarterly gures. Data
sample from 1976q1 to 2006q2.
economy. As we can see from panel 2, there is a strong upward trend in per-capita advertising,
showing that the number of advertising message per individual has constantly grown over all the
second half of the last century.
More interestingly for the purpose of this paper, gure (2) plots quarterly real advertising
expenditures along with real GDP, real total consumption, and real xed private investment.10
Basically, it shows that: (i) advertising is pro-cyclical; (ii) it is more volatile than GDP and
consumption, and less than investment.
Table 1 reports some related statistics. The overall picture conrms the previous conjecture:
advertising is a procyclical and high volatile series. Advertising displays indeed a high and positive
correlation with GDP (0.59), and it is 2.62 times more volatile than output. In addition, the point
estimate of rst order autocorrelation of 0:90 shows that innovations have a persistent eect on
advertising expenditures. Also, the positive correlation (0:26) between advertising-GDP ratio and
GDP itself suggests that advertising cannot be simply assumed as a constant proportion of output.
Compared with the other aggregates, we note that among the reported series, advertising dis-
plays the strongest correlation with total consumption expenditures (0:68). In terms of volatility,
advertising features a much higher standard deviation: our point estimates indicate that advertis-
ing is 3:64 times more volatile than consumption. In details, advertising is 4 times more volatile
than non-durable consumption and slightly more volatile than expenditures in durable goods (the
relative standard deviation is equal to 1:12). Finally, we note that advertising is less volatile than
10All the quarterly gures we use in this section are in logs and in per capita units. In gure (2), the cyclical
components have been extracted using a Band Pass (BP) lter with 6-32 as bands. For advertising, we previously
wash out the seasonal component present in the raw data using the X11 lter. Also, to control for spurious facts we
calculated all the statistics presented in this section both with BP and Hodrick-Prescott lter. The main empirical
evidence presented in this section do not change using one or the other lter.
7Table 1: Second order moments
Xt
(Xt)
(Gdpt) corr(Xt;Advt) corr(Xt;GDP t) corr(Xt;Xt 1)
Quarterly Data
Advertising 2.62 1 0.59 0.90
GPD 1 0.59 1 0.93
Consumption 0.72 0.68 0.91 0.94
Non-Dur. 0.60 0.67 0.79 0.93
Durables 2.33 0.60 0.90 0.92
Investment 3.41 0.64 0.93 0.94
Adv
GDP 2.18 0.93 0.26 0.88
Annual Data
GDP 1 0.72 1 0.08
Advertising 1.62 1 0.72 0.12
Adv
GDP 1.14 0.79 0.15 0.01
Note: (:) is in-sample standard deviation. Annual data have been detrended using the BP(2,8)
private xed investment. Indeed, in our sample the standard deviation of advertising is about 23%
lower than the investment one.11
Since we have only a partial series of aggregate advertising expenditures, we check the ro-
bustness of previous ndings by computing the same statistics with Coen's annual data. Re-
sults are in the second panel of Table 1. Annual data conrms the quarterly evidence: aggre-
gate advertising is pro-cyclical   corr(Advt;GDPt) = 0:72  , and more volatile than output  
(Advt)=(GDPt) = 1:62, as in quarterly data.
As last issue, we analyze the dynamic cross correlations between advertising, consumption, and
investment. Dynamic correlations are useful to provide empirical evidence to support or dismiss
the idea that advertising can be a leading indicator of the cycle.
As we can see from Table 2, advertising slightly leads GDP, but this evidence is not overwhelm-
ing. The cross-correlation coecient is almost the same at k=0 (0.59) and at k=1 (0.60). Also,
advertising appears to move contemporaneously with consumption (i.e. the strongest correlation
occurs at k=0), while it strongly leads investment (higher correlation occurs at k=-2 and k=-1)
over the cycle. Overall, the result from the dynamic cross-correlation analysis seem to dismiss the
idea that advertising is a leading indicator of the cycle. The fact that advertising slightly leads
GDP is possibly due to the fact that it co-moves with consumption, which itself has been shown
to slightly lead GDP in the data.12
All in all, we can summarize our main ndings as follows:
 The amount of resources invested in advertising in the U.S. accounts for roughly 2% of GDP.
11(adv)=(Inv) = 0:77
12This evidence is not clear in our data, where the correlation between consumption and output is almost the
same at k=0 and k=1, but it has been supported and analyzed in several papers, e.g. Wen (2001) and Wen and
Benhabib (2004).





k -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Advertising 0.01 0.20 0.38 0.52 0.59 0.60 0.55 0.47 0.38
Consumption 0.16 0.39 0.62 0.81 0.91 0.90 0.78 0.58 0.35
Investment 0.27 0.54 0.76 0.91 0.93 0.84 0.66 0.42 0.18
corr(Xt;Advt+k)
Consumption 0.35 0.46 0.57 0.65 0.68 0.63 0.51 0.34 0.13
Non-Dur. 0.34 0.47 0.59 0.67 0.67 0.60 0.46 0.28 0.08
Durables 0.16 0.26 0.38 0.50 0.60 0.64 0.58 0.44 0.25
Investment 0.51 0.63 0.70 0.71 0.64 0.51 0.32 0.12 -0.09
 Advertising is strongly procyclical, and positively correlated with both consumption and
investment.
 Advertising is highly volatile: more volatile than GDP, consumption, but less than invest-
ment. Also, it is persistent over the cycle.
3 A DSGE model with Advertising
In this section we describe our model economy. The market consists of a continuum of dier-
entiated goods produced by monopolistically competitive producers that posses the technology to
advertise their products. Advertising is assumed to generate an urge to consume the advertised
good. We obtain this eect by introducing advertising as an argument of the utility function that
is complementary to consumption. We will extensively support this modeling strategy in section
3.4.
Then, we embed the modied utility function with advertising into an otherwise standard
dynamic stochastic growth model with no nominal or real frictions, and we study the dynamics
of this model in reaction to: (i) a shock to the production technology; (ii) a shock to preferences;
(iii) a shock to the exogenous government spending; (iv) an idiosyncratic shock to the production
of advertising.
3.1 The household and the role of advertising
We assume that exists a representative consumer with preferences dened over consumption
and hours worked that are described by the utility function:
















where ~ Ct is a consumption aggregate, Ht is the time devoted to work, t is a preferences shock.














where " > 1 is the pseudo-elasticity of substitution across varieties; gi;t is the goodwill associated
with good i   the goodwill is meant to represent the stock of rm's advertising accumulated over
time  , and B() is a decreasing and convex function controlling for the impact of the goodwill on
consumer's preferences, satisfying B(0) = a  0.13
Building on Arrow and Nerlove (1962), we model the dynamic eect of advertising by assuming
that current and past advertising add up to create the reputation of a good, the producer's goodwill,
which is dened as the intangible stock of advertising that aects consumer's utility at time t, as
shown in (2). The stock of goodwill evolves according to the law of motion:
gi;t = zi;t + (1   g)gi;t 1 (3)
where zi;t is rm's investment in new advertising at time t, g 2 (0;1) is the depreciation rate of
the goodwill.
We introduce the concept of goodwill because several empirical studies shown that advertising
campaigns aect products sales for several periods, an evidence that seems robust across dierent
goods, countries, and time periods.14 Accordingly, a formalization of the goodwill as in (3) implies
that today sales are likely to be aected not only by current advertising expenditures, but also by
past advertising, with an intensity that fades out as time goes by.
In our setup the positive link between goodwill and sales operates through the eect of the








" B0(gi;t)  0 (4)
where the last inequality comes from the assumption that B() is decreasing in gi;t. This setup
re
ects what in the literature is known as the persuasive role of advertising: advertisements create
some added value to the good that would not otherwise exist. Accordingly, any good that is
advertised is worth more to consumers, as if it were a newly dierent good. The way we capture
this eect is to assume that increases of advertising raise the marginal utility of consumed goods.15
One advantage of this modeling strategy is to allow advertising to aect consumer's behavior
maintaining a certain analytical tractability when we solve the model.
The rest of the model is standard. We assume that the representative consumer holds one
asset, the capital stock Kt, which is assumed to evolve over time according to the following law of
motion:
Kt = It + (1   k)Kt 1 (5)
13It easy to see that the consumption aggregate (2) is a Stone-Geary type non homothetic utility function. De-
pending on whether the term B(gi;t) is assumed to be positive or negative, the utility displays a saturation point or
a subsistence level of consumption with respect to each variety. In both cases, however, the eect of advertising on
the market demand is the same. We will analyze this point in section 3.4
14In particular, see Clarke (1976) for an empirical study of the dynamic eects of advertising in U.S., and Bagwell
(2005) for a survey.
15Our assumption on (2) is in the spirit of the "catching up with the Joneses" hypothesis of Abel (1990), or
maybe more appropriately, with the single-good habits version proposed by Ravn Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006).
As in the case of external habits, the goodwill acts as a negative externality here, and when it increases it creates
dissatisfaction in the consumer about his current level of consumption.














The representative consumer rents whatever capital he owns to rms, and supplies labor services
per unit of time. Labor and capital markets are perfectly competitive, with a wage Wt paid per unit
of labor services, and a rental rate Rt paid for unit of capital. In addition, the consumer receives net
prots t from rms and pays lump sum taxes Tt to nance the exogenous government spending.
Under these assumptions, the representative agent's nominal budget constraint is dened as:
1 Z
0
pi;t (ci;t + ii;t)di  WtHt + RtKt 1 + t   Tt (7)
The utility maximization problem for the representative consumer can be stated as choosing
the processes ~ Ct, Ht in order to maximize the utility function (1) subject to (5) and (7).16 Notice
that in this framework consumer does not choose over the desired level of goodwill, which enters in
the utility function as a parameter with a value that is chosen by rms.17 The rst order conditions





t = E ft+1 [Rt + (1   k)]g (9)
tH

t = Wtt (10)
where t is the lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint, and Pt is the aggregate
price index. Equation (9) is the familiar Euler equation that gives the intertemporal optimality
condition, while equation (10) describes the labor supply schedule.
Optimality conditions (8), (9), (10) are standard in this type of models. Where our model
diers from the standard one is that the consumers' shadow price, t, now depends not only on
aggregate consumption but also on aggregate goodwill. Consequently, consumer's decisions about
labor and investment are both aected by the level of aggregate advertising.18
This mechanism plays a pivotal role to determine the general equilibrium results that we will
see in the next section. A Partial Equilibrium analysis of the model is useful to see this. Suppose,
for instance, that advertising expenditures increase exogenously for a suciently large fraction of
rms. Given our assumptions,
R
B (gi;t)di decreases and, as a consequence, the consumers' shadow
16To solve the maximization problem it is useful to write the budget constraint in the Lagrangian as function of ~ Ct,
It. Notice that at the optimum the following condition holds
1 R
0
pi;tii;tdi = PtIt and
1 R
0




17This feature is where our model diers from Becker's (1993) complementary theory of advertising. Following the
Persuasive view of advertising, we assume that the agent passively receives advertising signaling, which eventually
modies his preferences, without being aware of the eect of advertising on his utility. On the contrary, in Becker
(1993) the agent actively demands advertising about the goods he consumes, since the extra information brought
by advertisements increases the utility of consuming that good.
18In particular, insofar as e Ct has negative rst derivative with respect to the aggregate goodwill, then advertising
will increase both the level of aggregate consumption and the supply of labor.
11price, t, increases. Consider now the labor supply schedule (10). An increase in t implies that
the agent values more his consumption relative to leisure since, for a given wage, the marginal rate
of substitution increases. Hence, the labor supply schedule shifts to the right, that is, agents are
willing to work more in order to consume more.
The same mechanism also aects the consumers' saving decision. Indeed, since the goodwill
is an AR(1) process (see equation (3)), a purely transitory increase in the aggregate advertising
raises both the marginal utility of consumption today, t, and tomorrow, t+1. Thus, given the
Euler equation (9), the consumer experiences a dierent intertemporal elasticity of substitution
that obviously aects the saving function. However, while the labor supply unambiguously shifts
to the right, the total impact on the saving function is not easily predictable. As we will see in the
next section, this precisely depends on the expected dynamic response of the goodwill stock to a
shock hitting the economy. In particular, whenever the growth rate of the goodwill is expected to
be positive, the consumer will nd more convenient to postpone his consumption, since he foresees
that in the future his marginal utility will be higher. Conversely, when the growth rate of the
goodwill is negative, then the consumer experiences the urge in consumption, and increases his
demand of consumption today.19
Overall, this analysis suggests that from the stand point of a consumer aggregate advertising
can be interpreted as an exogenous state variable that modies its own supply of both labor
and saving. The former by modifying the elasticity to the wage rate, the latter by aecting the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
3.2 Firms
There is a continuum of rms indexed i 2 [0;1], each producing a dierentiated product, which
is sold as consumption, investment, or government good.
The optimal demand function of consumption goods is the solution to consumer's problem of
minimizing consumption expenditures subject to the aggregate constraint (2). It can be shown






















is the nominal price index.
The demand function (11) is a key relationship in our model. As we anticipated in the previous
section, it is increasing in the level of advertising: a positive investment in zi;t increases the stock
of goodwill gi;t, which in turns decreases B(gi;t). As result, the marginal utility of ci;t increases
(see equation (4)), making the consumer willing to pay more for the same amount of good, or
equivalently, willing to buy more for any given price. Accordingly, the demand function (11) shifts
to the right.
Thus, advertising acts in this model as a demand shifter that increases products sales. The
prediction of a positive relationship between sales and advertising is in line with a large number
19The mechanism is akin with the one that characterizes the eect of an exogenous taste shock.
12of empirical studies about advertising at the rm level.20 In our setup such a positive relationship
crucially depends on the assumption that advertising is an argument of the utility function. It
is worth noticing, however, that this assumption is not arbitrary once we restrict our attention
to models with Walrasian demand functions and perfect information. In this case the only way
advertising can enhance the demand is through a modication of the preference relation.21
In this setup advertising not only enhances the demand, but also diminishes its price elasticity,
which now is time varying and decreasing in the level of goodwill. In particular, according to (11)
the demand function is composed by two terms: the rst one, (Pi;t=Pt)
 " e Ct, with elasticity ",
and the second one, B (gi;t), which is inelastic. As a consequence, the price elasticity of demand
is a weighted average between the elasticity of those two terms, and its value will depend on the


















In particular, notice that the elasticity of demand (13) is smaller than the elasticity of demand
without advertising, i.e. with gi;t = 0. 22 The nding is a well know eect in the literature,
that is, through advertising a rm attempts to develop consumers' loyalty to its own product.
The intuition behind this mechanism is that advertising, although it does not modify the quality
of the advertised good, nonetheless increases the dierentiation among goods perceived by the
consumers. Using advertisements the rm can manipulate the elasticity of the demand, thus
increasing its market power, and eventually prots.23
Contrary to consumption, the demand functions for investment and government goods are
standard24 since advertising is assumed not to aect either the technology to combine single variety
goods into a unit of capital, or government purchases of goods. The rst assumption ts naturally
into our setup because advertising is assumed to aect consumption, while investment represents
here the alternative option for the agent that wants to postpone consumption in the future. So,
any enhancing eect of advertising on investment goods would have an ambiguous interpretation,
since it would diminish the willingness of the agent to consume, while advertising in this setup is
assumed to foster consumption. The second assumption about government purchases may appear
arbitrary, though. However, it can be shown that modeling a positive eect of advertising on
20A positive relationship between advertising and sales is one of the few non-controversial empirical evidence about
advertising. See Bagwell (2005), section 3.2, for more references.
21The argument goes by contradiction. Suppose that advertising shifts the demand, i.e. the consumer chooses two
dierent bundles of goods pre and post advertising, and that the preference relation remains unchanged. Also, recall
that advertising is assumed neither to be a productive factor, nor to aect the production technology. Consequently,
advertising does not change the quality of the goods, implying that pre and post advertising the consumer is choosing
his preferred bundle among the same basket of goods. Moreover, the assumptions that advertising does not aect
the production function, so the marginal cost, and that there is perfect information among all the agents, rule
out any direct eect of advertising on prices. In this case, after the advertising signal we would have that the
consumer chooses a dierent bundle of goods than before, but that this bundle should have been aordable before
the advertising signal. Now, since the preference relation is unchanged, such bundle yields lower utility than the
one chosen pre advertising. As result, post advertising the agent is choosing a bundle which is not preferred to the
pre advertising one, violating the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences. Hence, if the bundle chosen by the agent
before and post advertising changes, then also the preference relation must change, which justies the assumption
of advertising as an argument of the utility function. However, this argument does not hold true if we consider
models with Walrasian demand correspondences instead of functions. Therefore, preference relation in this model
must always be strictly convex.
22This occurs because B(gi;t) is decreasing in gi;t:
23The link between advertising and price elasticity reveals another important mechanism inherent to our model,
i.e. a positive eect of advertising on rms' markup, and therefore on prices.
24These demands are derived in Appendix B.
13government expenditures would strengthen the eect of advertising on aggregate dynamics, and
therefore we can take it as a conservative assumption with respect to the results we nd in this
paper.
Altogether, the demand for consumption, investment, ii;t, and government expenditures, fi;t,
forms the total demand of rm i at time t, i.e.:





~ Ct + It + Ft

  B(gi;t)
Firm i will choose a price for sales and a level of advertising in order to maximize the discounted

ow of future prots subject to the constraint given by the total demand. The optimal policy rules















't  i;t 't (14)
 (pi;t   't)B0(gi;t) + Et [(1   g)(i;t+1rt;t+1)] = i;t (15)
where 't is the marginal cost of production, and i;t is the marginal cost of producing new adver-
tising zi;t.
Equation (14) describes the familiar pricing policy in monopolistic competition models. The
rm exploits its monopolistic power by charging a positive markup (i;t) over the marginal cost.
However, dierently from the standard case, the markup in (14) is not xed but varies in time
according to the evolution of the goodwill stock, which aects the price elasticity of demand as we
showed in equation (13).
Equation (15) is the rm's optimal advertising policy. It states that a rm invests in advertising
until the marginal benet from an extra dollar of advertising equals the marginal costs of producing
it. Given the dynamic nature of the goodwill, the marginal benet has two components: the
increase in current revenues associated with a marginal increase in advertising, and the discounted
opportunity cost of not producing tomorrow the surviving goodwill produced today. It is possible
to go a bit further and show that equation (15) implies an optimal rule for the goodwill intensity
(i.e the ratio of goodwill stock to total sale). In particular, we get a result of the following form.
Proposition 1. Suppose that rm i's demand function is dened as in (11). Let g;t(i) and 
p;t(i)
respectively denote the gross elasticity of demand with respect to the goodwill stock and the net
elasticity of demand with respect to the price. Then, for any rm i the optimal goodwill intensity
is proportional to the ratio g;t(i)=
p;t(i).




where g;t(i) denotes the rm i's demand elasticity with respect to the goodwill stock. Using this






i;t   Et [(1   g)(i;t+1rt;t+1)]














p;t(i) = ((yi;t;gi;t)   1) is the net demand price elas-
ticity. Accordingly, the optimal goodwill intensity is proportional to the ratio g;t(i)=
p;t(i).
Notably, the proposition shows that we can establish an equivalence result between our optimal
advertising policy and the Dorfman-Steiner (1954) theorem. In particular, under the simplicative
assumptions of goodwill stock with total depreciation (g = 1) and common technology in the
production of goods and advertising, we get the standard Dorfman-Steiner result, that is, the
optimal budget for advertising expenditures is equal to the ratio between the elasticity of the
demand with respect to advertising over the elasticity of demand with respect to the price.
The optimal advertising policy is also useful to understand the determinants of advertising
itself. According to (15), advertising is sensitive both to variations to supply and demand condi-
tions. On the one hand, reductions in marginal costs lead to higher investments in advertising.
On the other hand, the marginal benet of advertising depends on the markup, which in turns is
positively aected by aggregate demand (see equation 14). Therefore, any exogenous increase in
the latter increases the markup and raises, at the same time, the optimal level of advertising.
Besides, notice that the markup itself is increasing in the level of goodwill. So, when advertising
increases the markup also increases. In fact, in this framework advertising and price setting are
complementary policies, in accordance with the theory of optimal advertising as the outcome of
rms playing a supermodular game, as shown in Tremblay (2005).25
Interestingly, from the optimal advertising policy (15) one can show that advertising generates
persistence in the dynamics of consumption, since in equilibrium (16) implies that the demand
function (11) depends on past sales as in models with habits in consumption, or in models of
customers markets.26 Notice, indeed, that equation (16) can be written as:
gi;t = tyi;t (17)
which shows that in this model each rm invests in advertising a proportion t of sales, with a time
varying coecient that depends, in particular, on the marginal cost of production and advertising.
Now, using (17) lagged one period to work out gi;t 1 from the law of motion of goodwill (3), and






e Ct + It + Ft

+   (t;yi;t 1;zi;t) (18)
where  () is a non linear function with non negative partial derivative with respect to the last two
arguments.27 As a result, equation (18) shows that demand faced by individual producers depends
25Also, notice that in the extreme case where advertising has no eect on the demand, (i.e. B
0() = 0), then
equation (15) implies that optimal advertising is equal to zero. Therefore, in this framework the only incentive for
rms to advertise is to manipulate the demand. In particular, no strategic reason, as for instance entry deterrence
is taken into account here.
26About this issue, see Ravn, Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2006), and the "habit persistence" entry of Palgrave
Economic Dictionary, written by Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2006).
27This follows immediately from the fact that B() is assumed to be strictly decreasing together with the fact that
non negative optimal advertising requires t > 0.
15on past sales. This result is driven from two properties of our setup: (i) the assumption that
consumer's preferences are aected by advertising; (ii) the dynamic nature of goodwill. Compared
with competing models that explained consumption persistence in the literature, the relevance
of our result hinges on the fact that consumption persistence with advertising is endogenously
determined in equilibrium, and not exogenously assumed as, for instance, with habits persistence.
Equation (18) reveals that, for a consumer, advertising eort of each individual rms is a
demand shifter that resembles an exogenous taste shock. In the aggregate, this potentially pro-
vides another channel through which exogenous innovations are transmitted to the economy. The
eect of a technology shock is particularly interesting. Suppose, for instance, that the economy
experiences an unanticipated increase in productivity. In this model, in addition to all the other
traditional mechanisms, a rm will also revise its own advertising policy. In particular, equation
(15) indicates that a positive technology shock leads to a higher level of rm's desired goodwill.
According to (18), this also implies an upward shift in the aggregate demand. In other words, after
a technology shock the level of the aggregate demand will increase instantaneously, not only be-
cause of the traditional channels but also because with advertising for any give price the consumer
is willing to buy more goods. This result explains why in next section we nd that the responses
of consumption and labor to a technology shock are, under some specic conditions, larger and
more persistent than in the benchmark model without advertising. Since in the literature it has
been often noticed that technology shocks cannot generate a business cycle as the one observed in
the data, we argue that a stronger internal propagation mechanism, as the one that occurs with
advertising, can possibly help to reconcile the business cycle theory with the data.28.
3.3 The Symmetric Equilibrium
In this model factor markets are perfectly competitive and rms share all the same production
technology. Thus, they all face the same marginal cost.29 Moreover, all rms face the same gross
elasticity of substitution among goods ". These two conditions jointly imply that there exists
a symmetric equilibrium where all rms set the same price, produce the same quantities, and
invest the same amount of resources in advertising.30 In addition, in each period the equilibrium
(common) price of goods is normalized to unity, i.e. pt = 1 8 t. So, all the other prices (e.g.
wage, rental rate) are expressed in terms of contemporaneous consumption.
Let Xt to be the vector of all endogenous variables,31 then the symmetric equilibrium for
this model is a process fXtg
1
t=0 that satises: (8)-(10), (14)-(15), plus the production function of
consumption goods and advertising, the optimal factors demand for these productions,32 the law
of motion of capital (5) and the one of goodwill (3), the market clearing condition on the goods
market, Yt = Ct+It+Ft, and the market clearing condition on the labor market, Ht = Hp;t+Ha;t.
3.4 Advertising in Utility Function: Functional Forms Assumptions
In order to fully specify the utility function we need to parameterize the function B() in a way
that satises all the specic requirements we have assumed so far. In addition, we are interested
in an appropriate specication that allows us to nest in the model the two competing theories of
advertising: market enhancing and spread-it-around hypothesis. The advantage of this strategy is
28In particular, in section 6 we use a variance decomposition from the estimated model to show that technology
shocks are able to explain a considerable part of the volatility of consumption and output observed in actual data
29The reader can check that inspecting the RHS of equation (26).
30Assuming also that the initial goodwill stock is common across the rms.
31Specically, Xt = (t; Gt; t; Zt; Ht; Ha;t; Hp;t; Ct; Kt; It; Yt; Rt; Wt; Qt;t+1).
32See Appendix B for details.
16that it will allow us not to take a stand on these dierent views, but to leave the data to choose
which theory is more likely to be true (conditional on macroeconomic data). It worths stressing
again this point because it is crucial to assess the eects of advertising on the aggregate economy.
Indeed, as we said in the introduction, if advertising enhances the single-good demands because it
steals customers from competitors, then it has no direct eect on aggregate consumption, which
in turns implies that in the aggregate advertising only absorbs resources without aecting in a
signicant way any other macroeconomic variable. On the contrary, if advertising increases the
market size for a good without decreasing other goods demand of the same amount, then it turns
out to aect in a potentially signicant way the level of aggregate consumption and, through this
channel, all other aggregate variables, like labor, output and prices.
Therefore, hereafter we assume that the function B(gi;t) is dened as follows:
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One can easily verify that (19) is a strictly decreasing and a convex function of the goodwill
stock. More importantly, we can see that in (19) the goodwill enters in quasi-dierence from its
aggregate mean value, meaning that the eect of a rm i's advertising on its own demand will also







 = 1, the aggregate goodwill does not enter in the marginal utility of consumption
(see equations (8) and (2)). So, it does not aect directly the representative consumer's decisions
about labor supply (9) and saving (10). As a consequence, advertising does not aect directly the
aggregate consumption demand, i.e. the spread-it-around hypothesis holds.
In this case the eects of the aggregate advertising on the economic activity are easily pre-
dictable. It absorbs resources without enhancing the demand, and it has no direct price eects.
Thus, it is a deadweight loss both for rms and consumers. However, notice that rms will still be
employing resources to advertise their products because in the non cooperative solution they do not
internalize the eect of their decisions on the market mean level of advertising. As a consequence,
they keep wasting money in an unproductive factor, while the eect of their advertisements on the
demand functions is oset by other rms' advertising.
Dierently, when 
 = 0 the goodwill enters in level in the utility function. Accordingly,
rm's i advertising aects the marginal utility of ci;t, and in turn shifts upward the demand
function of good i, no matter what the other rms do. In this case advertising directly aects
aggregate consumption, labor, and rms' markup. Finally, any value of 
 2 (0;1) implies a convex
combination between the two extreme cases (complete spread-it-around vs. market enhancing).
A consideration apart deserves the choice of S(). Equation (20) implies that the marginal
utility of consumption is bounded (for this reason we might refer to it as "bounded marginal
utility").34 In fact, in the demand function of good i there exists a maximum price above which
33This formulation implies that advertising is combative.
34As a matter of fact, preference featuring bounded marginal utility have been already used in the literature. See
for instance Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
17the demand is zero, due to the bound we impose on the marginal utility of consumption. When
the price is too high the marginal benet of consuming that good is smaller than its cost, and the
consumer drops it from his basket of purchases.
In the absence of advertising the bound is 1 in every period, whereas in presence of advertising
the value of the bound depends on the level of goodwill. In particular, the incentive for rms to
advertise is the eect of the goodwill in reducing the bound, which implies that the consumer is
willing to pay a higher price for the advertised good. Finally notice that the eect of the goodwill
is bigger the higher is , which therefore can be interpreted as a measure of the eectiveness of
advertising in manipulation consumer's tastes.
4 Impulse-Response Analysis
In what follows we refer to a log-linear approximation of model's policy functions in the neigh-
borhood of the non-stochastic steady state. Rational expectations are solved to obtain the dynamic
responses of endogenous variables as function of the state variables. We characterize the response of
model's variables to several exogenous shocks, namely: a technology shock (gure 3), a preferences
shock (gure 4), a shock on the exogenous government spending (gure 5), and an idiosyncratic
shock to the advertising production function (gure 6).
To compute the impulse-response functions (IRFs), we require values for the model' structural
parameters: [, , , , ", , , z, a, f, h, h, a, f, g, k, 
]. Much of them are standard
for which it has been used common values. In particular, the discount parameter  is set to
(1:04) :25, implying a yearly nominal interest rate of about 4%. The depreciation rate of capital
k is equal to 2:5% per quarter, and the gross elasticity of substitution across varieties equal to
6. These values are standard in the Business Cycle literature. Following Prescott (1986), we set
the preference parameter  to ensure that in the non stochastic steady state, households devote
1=4 of their time to labor activities. Following Ravn, Schmitt-Groh and Uribe (2006), we set the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution to 0.5, the labor elasticity of output, , to 0:75, the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply to 1.3, and the government expenditures-GDP ratio, sf, to 0:12. These
restrictions imply that the preference parameters  and  are, respectively, 2 and 0.77, and the
steady state labor share is 0:71.35
Values for the advertising related parameters have been assigned using the following strategy.
The goodwill depreciation rate has been xed to 0:3, implying that the half life of the goodwill
stock is about two quarters. This value is consistent with the empirical evidence provided in
Clarke (1976), such that the eect of advertising on the rm's demand vanishes after roughly one
year. As a benchmark case, we set the parameter 
 to zero, while the intensity of advertising in
the preferences, , is chosen such that, conditional to all the other parameters, the steady-state
advertising-GDP ratio is equal to 2:27 %. This value is consistent with the US average over the
period 1948-2005.36
The autoregressive parameter for all the endogenous process have been set to 0.95. This number
35In our framework the steady state labor share, denoted by sh, takes the following form:
sh =









so that, the usual relation between the intensity of labor in the production function and the labor share is not
anymore guaranties. Notice that, in the last equation  denotes the average long run markup.
36This number refers to the ratio of advertising expenditures to GDP net of exports.
18Table 3: Calibration
Parameter Value Description
 :9902 Subjective discount factor
" 6 Elasticity of substitution across varieties
k 0:025 Capital depreciation rate
 2:49 Steady State of the preference shock
g 0:3 Goodwill depreciation rate
 0:77 Preference parameter
 2:54 Intensity of advertising in the utility function
 0:75 Labor elasticity of output
 2 Preference parameter
sf 0:12 Government expenditures-Gdp ratio
a;h;g;z 0:95 Persistence of exogenous shocks
a 7:9e   3 Standard error of the technology shock
f 9:8e   3 Standard error of the government spending shock
h 6:2e   3 Standard error of the preference shock
is intermediate among the values normally used in the Business Cycle literature. For the simulated
exercise, following Rebelo and King (1998) and Collard (2006), we set the standard deviation of
technology shock, a, and government expenditures shock, f to, respectively, 0.0079 and 0.0089.
Finally, the standard deviation of the preference shock, h, is chosen such that the volatility of
hours worked in the model matches its empirical counterpart of 0:91%.37 Time period in the model
is a quarter. Table 3 summarizes the set of calibrated parameters.
We plot the IRFs for dierent values of the spread-it-around parameter 
, and we use the
associated model economy where advertising is banned as benchmark to evaluate the impact of
advertising.
A number of results are worth emphasizing. First, we note that advertising responds positively
to any of the shocks considered. A rst explanation of such a result comes directly from equation
(17), since it implies a positive relation between aggregate goodwill and aggregate demand. Hence,
the latter provides an upward pressure to the goodwill stock whenever it increases as a consequence
of a particular shock. This occurs because, at rm level, optimal goodwill is positively related to
its marginal benet which, in turns, depends on the demand. In addition, this explains why
advertising reacts positively to both preferences (Figure (4)) and government (Figure (5)) shocks.
However, out of the shocks considered, we note that advertising reacts strongly whenever the shock
aects directly productivity. For instance, with a positive technology shock (see Figure (3)) the
advertising impact response is more than two times bigger that the one with a preference shock.
This occurs because when the economy experiences an unexpected increase in productivity, a rm
revises its own advertising policy not only because of dierent demand condition but also because
advertising becomes instantaneously more ecient. In addition, the dynamic nature of advertising
37This number refers to the standard deviation of the bandpass ltered hours worked in our sample.
































































Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions to technology shock. Each plot displays percent deviation
from steady state of the corresponding variable in response to a 1% increase in the rate of productivity.
amplies this eect by making the incentive to invest in today advertising particularly strong.
Second, as immediate consequence of the previous mechanism, we note that in our model
advertising is pro-cyclical as in real data. This is further conrmed by the fact that in all the
shocks considered the advertising and output responses display the same sign at both the impact
and during all the transition after the shock. This result is particularly appealing since it shows
that our simple model is able to replicate the observed co-movements between advertising and
GDP. In addition, this feature appears to be essentially independent from the value assigned to
parameter 
. Indeed, we note that the response of advertising is positive as the output one, no
matter which value we assigned to parameter 
. 38
Third, the parameter 
 is instead crucial to isolate the aggregate eects of advertising expen-
ditures. We note that under the market enhancing hypothesis (i.e. 
 6= 1), advertising operates
as a mechanism that amplies and propagates the eects of all stochastic shocks on consumption,
output and hours worked.39 Not surprisingly, the eect is stronger the higher is the parameter 
.
Conversely, under the spread demand around rms hypothesis (
 = 1), the eects of advertising
on the aggregate dynamics are negligible. As we can see from the pictures, in this case the impulse
response functions of all the main economic aggregates essentially coincide with the benchmark
ones.
To understand the mechanism behind these results, it is important to bear in mind that in
this model the parameter 
 is crucial for aggregate advertising being a determinant of labor and
saving supplies. However, this happens only when the parameter 
 is dierent from 1. Indeed,
we know that in such a case, aggregate advertising is an externality for consumers, since it does
38Consequently, with respect to this particular feature of the data, in our framework the hypothesis of advertising
as market enhancing mechanism is observationally equivalent to the spread it around hypothesis.
39This is evident from the picture by comparing that variables' impulse response functions with the benchmark
ones.

































































Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions to preferences shock. Each plot displays percent deviation
from steady state of corresponding variable in response to a 1% decrease in the preference shock.
modify their own choices by aecting their consumption marginal utilities. Conversely, saving and
labor supplies are not directly aected and all the equilibrium eects are driven by the excess
of labor demand that results from the production of advertising expenditures. In such a case,
the numerical analysis shows that the eects are negligible, since the pressure generated by the
advertising resources absorbtion on the equilibrium prices are too modest in order to aect the
other aggregates in a quantitatively relevant way. Hence, our model conrms the conjecture of
Simon and Solow: under the spread it around hypothesis advertising is irrelevant in an aggregate
perspective. By contrast, as long as 
 6= 1, advertising operates as an amplication mechanism
that aects the behavior of consumption, output and labor. As far as the latter is concerned,
we note that the excess of labor supply is so strong that the equilibrium level of hours worked
increases even if the equilibrium wage rate is substantially lower than the benchmark one.40 This
mechanism is the so called work and spend cycle (Schor (1992)) that has been already supported
by several empirical works, like Brack and Cowling (1983) for U.S., and Fraser and Paton (2003)
for UK. 41
The dynamic behavior of consumption is particularly interesting. Compared with the bench-
mark model, we note that under the market enhancing hypothesis aggregate consumption displays
a lower response at the impact of the shock, but a stronger hump-shaped impulse response func-
tion. As it was already argued, this suggests that with advertising the consumers faces a dierent
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. To see the point it is useful to rewrite the log-linearized
Euler Equation in terms of expected consumption growth, that is:







40To save space the wage impulse-response functions are not reported, but they are available from the authors
upon request.
41See Molinari and Turino (2007) for further details.





















































Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions to government spending shock. Each plot displays percent
deviation from steady state of corresponding variable in response to a 1% shock on government spending.
where c;p and c;g are the steady state demand elasticity with respect to price and goodwill
stock, respectively. Accordingly, aggregate advertising modies the saving decision along two
dierent intertemporal dimensions. On the one hand, since the elasticity c;g is positive, expected
variations in the aggregate goodwill stock modify directly and in the same direction the expected
consumption growth. Intuitively, households correctly anticipate the eects that movements in
this variable imply on the marginal evaluation of consumption, modifying accordingly the degree
of consumption smoothness over time. In addition, the eect is stronger the lower is parameter

. On the other hand, the elasticity of expected consumption growth to the real interest rate is
lower than the benchmark one. This is true because with advertising the long run equilibrium is
characterized by a lower aggregate price elasticity, c;p.42 Thus advertising exerts on the saving
function two opposite pressures whenever the responses of the interest rate and expected goodwill
growth to an exogenous shocks have the same sign. The actual impact will obviously depends on
the relative strengths of those dierent eects.43 The numerical analysis shows that the rst eect
dominates the second at the impact of the shock and during all the transition in which the goodwill
displays a positive growth rate. This is conrmed by the behavior of aggregate investments. As we
can see from the pictures, in all the cases considered the investment impulse-response is stronger
than the benchmark one at the impact of the shock and up to the quarter in which the goodwill
stock reaches its peak.44 This eect is particularly interesting because it shows that, contrary to
the conventional wisdom, a positive link between aggregate consumption and advertising need not
42For a formal proof see Molinari Turino (2007)
43In addition, since the impulse response function of the goodwill stock is in general hump-shaped, during the
all transition to the steady state the consumer experiences a time varying intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Accordingly, the sensitivity of saving function to the interest rate is not anymore constant as in the benchmark
model.
44Note that in the case of government expenditures shock aggregate investment is less crowded out.





































Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions to a shock on advertising production function. Each
plot displays percent deviation from steady state of corresponding variable in response to a 1% shock on
the production function of advertising.
to be necessarily associated with a crowding out eect on aggregate investment. On the contrary,
once we account for the dynamic eect of advertising and, in particular, the eect on the labor
supply, an equilibrium in which consumption, hours and investment all increase is instead possible,
at least in the short run.
The larger availability of labor together with the behavior of consumption and investment
generate a upward pressure on the aggregate demand. As a result, the equilibrium response of
output to any shock considered is stronger than the benchmark one. Hence, our model conrms
the conjecture of Kaldor such that advertising can potentially amplify the economic activity'

uctuations. However, this result is possible only if advertising aects directly the consumers'
decisions (
 6= 1), otherwise the impact on total output is instead negligible.
Fifth, gure (6) shows that an unexpected increase in advertising productivity can aect the
economy' 
uctuations in a non trivial way. As we can see from the picture, a 1% increase in
advertising productivity implies a positive response of all the main economic aggregates. Again,
this result requires advertising being a determinant of both labor and saving supplies, otherwise
the eects are negligible. Overall, this numerical experiment conrms once again that in our model
advertising successfully aects the aggregate dynamics only when directly modies the consumers'
choices.
Finally, under the market enhancing hypotheses, advertising increases the 
uctuations of the
markup. Note that in a model with bounded marginal utility the markup is procyclical because
the elasticity of the demand is inversely related to the output (i.e. higher output steeper demand).
Now, according to equation (15) during booms rms advertise more because each unit of advertising
yields higher marginal benet. Thus, after a positive shock the goodwill increases, further reducing
the elasticity of demand (see equation 14), and thus amplifying the response of the markup. The
intuition is that with a higher level of advertising the consumer values more his consumption, and










































Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions of markup to all the shocks considered. Each plot displays
percent deviation from steady state of corresponding variable in response to each shock.
rms exploit the consumer's higher willingness to pay for consumption by raising the markup.
5 Welfare Analysis
The impact of advertising on aggregate dynamics can be quantied comparing the welfare costs
of 
uctuations from this model with the ones from the associated benchmark economy without
advertising. As usual in the literature on welfare,45 the costs of 
uctuations are dened as the
units of Steady State consumption that the consumer would be willing to pay to eliminate all the
variability from his consumption stream. Such costs are computed as the dierence between the 2nd
order Taylor approximated utility of the agent endowed with the equilibrium bundle fCt;Htg, and
the approximated utility of an agent that gets in every period the steady state level of consumption
and works the steady state amount of hours.
In case of welfare costs comparison between two economies endowed with dierent preferences
relations, as the one we have here, several authors in the literature suggested to make a double
comparison using both preference relations involved.46 However, we do not pursue such approach
here because in our model the goodwill is an argument in the utility function, which implies that
its variance biases the costs of 
uctuations. To control for the eect of the goodwill it seems to us
a more appropriate choice to consider only ex-ante preferences, i.e. to compute the welfare costs
using the utility function from the benchmark economy.47
Table 5 reports the welfare costs of 
uctuations in our model. We isolate the eect of advertising
45See Erceg Henderson and Levin (2000), or Otrok (2001).
46See Benhabib and Bisin (2002). This point is explained in details in Molinari and Turino (2007).
47In the literature on advertising, the preferences relation where advertising does not enter in the utility function
is typically referred as ex-ante preference relation.
24by comparing the percent increase in the costs of 
uctuations when switching from the benchmark
economy without advertising to the model economy with advertising (percentages in parentheses
in table 5).48 To check the robustness of our results, we use dierent calibrations for the two
parameters that enter in the utility function, i.e. risk aversion  and Frisch elasticity of labor 1
.
Ex-ante preference relation, 
 = 0
Costs in percentage of SS consumption






















Table 4: Welfare costs of Fluctuations. In parentheses the percent increase in welfare costs
from the benchmark model without advertising to the model with advertising and 
 = 0.
As apparent from table 5, when rms can advertise their goods the consumer is always willing
to pay an higher percentage of his steady state consumption to get rid of 
uctuations. The extra
cost due to advertising ranges between 17;7% and 145%, and worths 23% in the baseline calibration
model.
6 Model Estimation
The model used in section 4.1 is estimated with Bayesian technique using macroeconomic time
series quarterly data of U.S. economy. The sample goes from 1976:1 to 2006:2, i.e. the interval
for which we have data on aggregate advertising (see section 2). Bayesian estimation is preferred
among other estimation techniques for several reasons. First, in our model a crucial variable
to estimate is the unobservable goodwill stock, and the maximum likelihood approach with the
Kalman lter used to evaluate the likelihood is the more natural way to cope with unobservable
variables. Second, the eects of advertising typically spreads in the economy through various
transmission channels, which can be entirely assessed only once we compute the general equilibrium
solution of the model. Therefore, any estimation that exploits only the information contained in
partial equilibrium relationships, e.g. a GMM estimation of the Euler Equation, would neglect to
consider some important information from the model.
Specically, to estimate the model we proceed as follows. First, we derive the VARMA repre-
sentation of the log-linearized model used in section 3:49
b xt = 	x ()b xt 1 + 	 ()t (22)
where b xt is the vector of partially latent endogenous variables50 in log-deviations from their steady
state values, and 	x () and 	() are matrixes containing the structural parameters of the model.
48We consider the economy with 
 = 0, which is the case where advertising has its strongest aggregate eect.
49See the appendix C for a detailed explanation of the model used in the estimation of the structural parameters.
50The vector of endogenous variables is dened in section 3.5
25Then, we add four measurements equations that links model variables to four key macroeconomic
observable variables. In particular, we use log dierence data of: real consumption, real output net
of exports, total hours worked, and aggregate real advertising expenditures.51 The corresponding































^ yt   ^ yt 1
^ ct   ^ ct 1
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where  = log() is the common quarterly growth rate trend, and  is the theoretical deterministic
trend of technology. Finally, using the state-space representation (22)-(23), the model structural
parameters are estimated in order to maximize the likelihood of observed data conditional to
our model or, in other words, choosing the vector  that maximize the log posterior kernel of 
conditional to x
t.52
In the estimated model the structure of shocks is slightly dierent from the one presented in
section 3 because we shut down the shock on advertising and introduce a shock on the elasticity
of the demand. This turns out to be a good estimation strategy to use jointly information from
all the observable to identify all the parameters. The shock on the elasticity of the demand is
usually interpreted in the literature a as a cost push shock on rms markup. Notice that once
we shut down a shock we need to replace it because the estimated model must have a number of
structural shocks equals the number of observable variables to which it is tted. This is done to
avoid the potential problem of singularity in the covariance matrix of forecast errors due to model
mis-specication.
In the estimation we keep some parameters xed, namely the discount rate , the gross elasticity
of demand , the depreciation rate of capital k, the depreciation rate of the goodwill g, and the
steady state value of the preference shock . The rst three parameters are typically of dicult
identication in RBC models, while g turns out to be not identiable separately from . Finally,
we xed  because we are using data on worked hours in dierence, which leaves undetermined
the mean level of hours worked. Fixed parameters are calibrated according to the values in table
(3).
All the other parameters, f; ; ; z; ; ; 
; a; h; f; mk; a; h; i; mkg, are estimated
combining the information from the likelihood of actual data x
t with the one contained in the
priors. Distributions for the priors are chosen according to what is used in the literature, while
priors means are chosen such that steady states of model variables match selected long run moments
of U.S. postwar data at priors means. Details are given in the tables (5) and (6):
In general our priors for the structural parameters are quite 
at. The prior on  is a gamma
distribution (i.e.  is bounded away from zero) with mean 2.50 and variance 0.4. Given g = 0:3,
this value of  implies a ratio of advertising over GDP equal to 0.02, in line with the empirical
evidence presented in section 2. The prior for 
 is an uniform (0,1) distribution, which re
ects
our neutral stand between spread-it-around and market enhancing hypotheses. For the shocks
processes we use very standard priors, following Smets and Wouters (2007), Chang Doh and
Schorfheide (2006), and An and Schorfheide (2007).
Then, Bayesian estimation proceeds as follows. First, the posterior kernel is maximized in order
to nd the mode of the posterior distribution. Second, starting from a random perturbation around
51A detailed explanation of the data set is available in Appendix A.
52The log posterior kernel lnK( j x

t) is a linear combination between our prior knowledge about the distribution
of , lnp(), and the log likelihood of  conditional to the observed data, lnL( j x

t).
26Table 5: Prior Distributions of Structural Parameters
Parameter Density Domain Mean 90% interval
 Gamma R+ 2.00 [1.39, 2.70]
 Gamma R+ 0.77 [0.19, 1.46]
 Gamma R+ 2.50 [1.88, 3.19]

 Uniform [0;1] 0.5 [0.10, 0.90]
 Beta [0;1) 0.75 [0.68, 0.81]
z Beta [0;1) 0.75 [0.68, 0.81]
 Normal R .005 [.0017, .0083]
Table 6: Prior Distributions of Shock Processes
Parameter Density Domain Mean 90% interval
y InvGamma R+ .008 [.001, .022]
h InvGamma R+ .034 [.007, .096]
f InvGamma R+ .099 [.020, .279]
mk InvGamma R+ .039 [.008, .109]
y Beta [0;1) 0.6 [0.25, 0.90]
h Beta [0;1) 0.6 [0.25, 0.90]
f Beta [0;1) 0.6 [0.25, 0.90]
mk Beta [0;1) 0.6 [0.25, 0.90]
the mode, a random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to sample from the posterior
distribution.53 We run this algorithm 4 times from dierent perturbations, eventually building 4
chains of 70,000 draws each.54 This strategy seems to assure relatively fast convergence of Markov
chains generated from the algorithm, at least compared to what is usually reported in related
literature. Convergence diagnostic indicates that around 40,000 drawings are enough to attain
convergence for all the parameters.55
As last step, we report selected statistics for the posterior distributions by computing the
correspondent moments from the Markov chains where we discard the initial 40% of observations
from each chain. In tables (7) and (8) we report the mean and its 90% interval from posterior
distributions. In Appendix C.3 we provide a set of gures with posterior and prior distributions
for each parameter.
Our rst concern is for the results of  and 
, the two parameters related with advertising. The
estimates seems quite informative, both posteriors have less variance than corresponding priors.
53The variance of the jumping distribution is the inverse of the Hessian from the maximization of the mode,
multiplied by 0.35. Acceptance rate is around 35%. The initial perturbation is a single draw from a normal
distribution with zero mean and variance equals to 5 times the variance of the jumping distribution. This larger
variance helps to assure that together the chains visit the whole parameter space.
54As a robustness check, we have also estimated the model building 2 dierent chains of 500,000 draws each. We
nd that expending the length of draws does not aect our results. The results are however available from the
authors upon request.
55See Appendix C.2 for details about the convergence diagnostic.
27Table 7: Posterior Distributions of Structural Parameters
Prior Posterior
Parameter Mean 90% interval Mean 90% interval
 2.00 [1.39, 2.70] 2.48 [1.87 3.08]
 0.77 [0.19, 1.46] 2.52 [1.76 3.37]
 2.50 [1.88, 3.19] 2.62 [1.96 3.27]

 0.50 [0.10, 0.90] 0.39 [0.00 0.76]
 0.75 [0.68, 0.81] 0.67 [0.61 0.73]
z 0.75 [0.68, 0.81] 0.73 [0.69 0.77]
 .005 [.0017, .0083] .0035 [.0031 .0041]
Table 8: Posterior Distributions of Shock Processes
Prior Posterior
Parameter Mean 90% interval Mean 90% interval
y .008 [.001, .022] .006 [.0056 .0070]
h .034 [.007, .096] .019 [.0146 .0248]
f .099 [.020, .279] .047 [.0294 .0655]
mk .004 [.008, .109] .020 [.0157 .0246]
y 0.6 [0.25, 0.90] 0.93 [0.886 0.976]
h 0.6 [0.25, 0.90] 0.94 [0.917 0.974]
f 0.6 [0.25, 0.90] 0.95 [0.926 0.984]
mk 0.6 [0.25, 0.90] 0.83 [0.763 0.903]
The posterior mean of  suggests that a value of 3 is a reasonable value for this parameter. This
result supports the calibration used in Molinari and Turino (2007), and implies a ratio of advertising
over GDP of 1;6% in the estimated model. This results is notable because it is obtained using
data in rst dierences, therefore without using any information about the levels of advertising
and output from the data.
The posterior mean of 
 is close to 0.4, and the upper bound of 1 is signicatively rejected
from the data.56 This suggests that aggregate advertising is a signicant explanatory variable of
aggregate consumption, as conjectured in the market enhancing hypothesis. As a consequence, this
estimation comfort the view that advertising aects the labor supply, as conjectured in Molinari
and Turino (2007).
Among the other parameters, particular attention deserve the estimates of  and . Means from
posterior distributions of these parameters are relatively high compared with previous estimations
in the literature, e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007), or with the calibrations typically used in the RBC
56We estimated several specications of the model, in all of them estimates of b 
 where signicantly dierent from
1, ranging in b 
 2 (0:00; 0:39).
28literature. In order to check this fact, we estimate a standard RBC model without advertising
as benchmark, both using a utility function with the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, and the
Bounded Marginal utility. The data set is the same used for the advertising model, and estimates






























Table 9: Posterior Distributions for f;g in dierent models. 90% condence interval in paren-
theses.
While the evidence on  are mixed, the ones on  clearly indicates higher estimates in the
model with advertising. Our interpretation of this result relies on the eect of advertising on the
marginal utility of consumption. Typically, in standard RBC model the estimation of  turns
out to be low because the model predict an excess of consumption smoothing with respect to
the data. In this model advertising is an argument in the utility function that co-moves with
consumption, but has an opposite eect on the marginal utility. Therefore the eect of advertising
on the volatility of the marginal utility osets the one for consumption volatility, reconciling the
evidence of constant marginal utility from the model with the volatile series of consumption.
Finally, the estimates of the parameters for the shocks processes are in line with the ones found
in the empirical literature for similar DSGE models, e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007), suggesting
that our model is able to treat the uncertainty present in the data with the same degree of accuracy
than the one reported from similar model estimations in the literature.
In section 4.1 we made a point about the behavior of advertising in the model as a build-in
mechanism of transmission of technology shocks to shifts in the aggregate demand. The variance
decomposition from the estimated model is useful check our intuition. We plot variance decom-
position from the estimated model with advertising against the variance decomposition from an
estimated version of the model where advertising in banned.
Results from table (8) conrm our previous intuition. In the model with advertising technology
shocks account for a bigger proportion of consumption, output, labor and investment volatility.
In particular, once we introduce advertising in the model, technology shocks account for roughly
10% more of consumption volatility, and 17% more of output volatility than in the benchmark
model without advertising, whereas the exogenous preferences shocks account for 15:3% less of
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Figure 8: Total variance decomposition for selected variables.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we seek to understand the observed behavior of advertising over the business
cycle, and its eect on aggregate dynamics. To this end, rst we showed that actual U.S. data of
aggregate advertising expenditures have a well-behaved pattern over the Business Cycle. Second,
we build a model that can rationalize this pattern within the neoclassical growth models theory.
Third, we show that a log-linearized version of the model can t well actual data. Fourth, we
show that under some conditions advertising can have a relevant impact on aggregate dynamics.
Finally, we use an estimated version of the model to test whether these conditions hold. In our
framework this is equivalent to test the spread-it-around against the market enhancing hypothesis
as originally stated respectively by Solow (1968) and Galbraith (1958).
Our main nding is that the second hypothesis is preferred by the data. From an econometric
point of view, this result hinges on the signicance of aggregate advertising as explanatory variable
of the volatility of aggregate consumption. This nding in turn implies that aggregate advertising
enters in agents' choice about the desired level of consumption and labor, and we show that it
has a non-negligible impact over the whole aggregate dynamics. Despite the modest size of the
advertising industry over total production, i.e. roughly 2% of GDP in U.S., its short run impact
on the business cycle turns out to be quantitatively important, exacerbating the welfare costs of

uctuations of 23% when going from an economy where advertising is banned to one economy
where rms are free to advertise their products. Overall, the model goes in the direction suggested
by Kaldor (1950): advertising amplies aggregate 
uctuations.
Also, we show that advertising has important eects on prices, aecting the behavior of the
markup over the cycle. Since in our framework the optimal advertising policy is a positive function
of the sales, and the price elasticity of the demand is a negative function of advertising, then the
30markup turns out to be procyclical. Moreover, its volatility is 20% higher when rms advertise
than in the benchmark economy with no advertising.
It is worth noticing that our setup is the worst scenario to obtain any enhancing eect of
advertising in the aggregate. In a model with nominal rigidities the consumer would further
increase the supply of labor in response to new advertising because his wage varies less. This
would strengthen the work and spend cycle mentioned above. Also, in a model with fully 
exible
prices as the one we use here, any increase of the markup due to advertising makes the investment
goods more expensive, thus reducing the real return on capital, and in turns household savings.
So, the general equilibrium eect of advertising on investment is negative, and partially osets
the positive eect on consumption from the work and spend mechanism, thus reducing the overall
enhancing eect of advertising on the aggregate demand.57
Lastly, we show that advertising in this model behaves as an endogenous taste shock, with
an intensity which is controlled by rms, and varies in the optimum whenever a technology shock
occurs. This feature of the model leads to the observation that a shock to the productivity directly
aects the aggregate demand through advertising. In fact, we nd evidence that disregarding the
advertising channel in a RBC model may lead to underestimate the eect of technology shocks in
generating business cycle 
uctuations.
57In an early draft of this paper we showed that in a two sectors model where consumption and investment are
composed by dierent goods, advertising not only increases consumption, but also investment, since it lowers the
relative price of investment goods. Thus, its overall eect on the aggregate demand was stronger than the ones
presented in this paper.
31A Sources of Data
A.1 Data on Advertising
Advertising expenditures in TV, Cable, Radio, Magazines, and Outdoor:
Ad$Summary, quarterly issues from 1976:1 to 2006:2, issued by Media Market New York City
Advertising expenditures in newspaper:
Newspaper Association of America. Data available on the ocial website of the Association:
http://www.naa.org/
Annual advertising expenditures and its components:
Universal McCann, Robert Coen's Annual Report, Estimated Annual U.S. Advertising Expen-
ditures from 1958 to 2006.
A.2 Macroeconomic Data
Source: Database "FRED II" of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Luise available at
the website: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDPC96)
Real Exports of Goods & Services (EXPGSC96)
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCECC96)
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods (PCDGCC96)
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods: (PCNDGC96)
Real Private Fixed Investment (FPIC96)
GDP Implicit Price De
ator (GDPDEF)
Civilian Employment-Population Ratio (EMRATIO)
Civilian Non-Institutional Population (CNP160V)
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Available at the website: http://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm
Total Private Average Weekly Hours of Production Workers (CES050007)
Total Non-farm Employment (CES050001)




where 168 normalizes weekly hours to agents' total endowment of hours in a week. Alternatively





B.1 Firm's costs minimization problem
To produce its good each rms employs two inputs, labor and capital, combined according to




where yi;t; ki;t; Hp;t(i), denote respectively rm's output, capital stock, and production-related
labor. At measures the stochastic technological progress of the Total Factor Productivity, and  t
is the labor augmenting technological progress, which follows a deterministic trend, i.e.  t =  t 1.
Firm's demand of production-related inputs is the solution to the dual problem of total cost
minimization, given by Wthpi;t + Rtki;t, and subject to the production function constraint (24).


















(1 ) is a positive constant.
Also, each rm promotes its sales by incurring in advertising expenditures. As in Grossmann
(2007), we assume that advertising is produced by the marketing department of the rm using the
following technology:
zi;t = At t (Ha;t(i))
 Uz
t (27)
where zi;t; Ha;t(i) denote respectively the new investment in advertising and the marketing-related
labor. Uz
t is a purely transitory idiosyncratic shock on advertising productivity.
B.2 Prots maximization problem
Each producer faces three demands for its product. One for consumption, i.e. (11), one for
investment, and one for government purchases.
The demand function for investment goods derives from the solution to consumer's dual prob-







About government's demand of goods, recalling the assumption that advertising does not
aect government's choices, we can write it goods as the solution of the consumer's problem of










where for simplicity we set the bound in utility to zero.
Thus, we can derive the total demand for good i as





~ Ct + It + Ft

  B(gi;t) (30)
35where (30) uses (11) (29) and (28).
Then, rm's problem of prots maximization can be stated as choosing a sequences of prices






Q0;t (pi;tyi;t   CT(yi;t)   WtHa;t(i)) (31)
subject to
gi;t = zi;t + (1   g)gi;t 1








~ Ct + It + Ft

  B(gi;t)
where Q0;t is the discount factor. CT(yi;t) is dened as in equation (25).





















 (pi;t   't)B0(gi;t) + E [(1   g)(t+1Qt;t+1)] = t (34)
C Estimation
C.1 The estimated model
To ensure that the economy evolves along a balanced growth path we have to modify the
consumers' preference. First, we assume that representative household derives utility from the
object ~ Ct relative to the level of technology,  t. That is, equation (1) is replaced with the following
utility function:




















As in An and Schorfheide (2007), the term  t in the previous equation can be interpreted as







(1   S (gi;t))di
1
A (36)





36One can easily show that these assumptions, together with the assumed production functions,
guarantee that existence of a balanced growth equilibrium in which all the endogenous variable
growth a the same rate, , with the exception of mark-up, interest rate and labor which are instead
constant.
It is therefore convenient to express the model in terms of detrended variables, for which there
exists a deterministic steady state.58 Let c Xt = Xt= denote the ratio of a variable Xt with respect
to its deterministic trend, . The model can be expressed as:
b ~ Ct = b Ct +
1 + 
 b Gt
























































1 +  b Gt























b Kt 1 + b It (50)
58An equilibrium in which all the stochastic innovation are zero all the time.
37b Yt = b Ct + b It + b Ft (51)
b Yt = At b K1 
t 1 H
p;t 1 (52)
log(At) = alog(At 1) + a
t (53)
log(t) = (1   h)log() + hlog(t 1) + h
t (54)
log(Ft) = (1   f)log(F) + flog(Ft 1) + 
f
t (55)
log("t) = (1   p)log(") + plog("t 1) + 
p
t (56)















































The system of equations (38)-(56) fully describes the model economy. Let ^ xt = log( b Xt)  
log(X) denote the percentage deviation of the variable b Xt with respect to its deterministic steady-
state. The VARMA representation of the model is determined by solving the linear system of
rst order stochastic dierence equations obtained by log-linearized equations (38)-(56) around
the deterministic steady-state:
b xt = 	x ()b xt 1 + 	 ()t (57)
where b xt is a vector containing all the endogenous variables in percentage deviation with respect
to its steady state, t is a vector containing all the exogenous innovations, and 	x and 	 are
matrixes whose entries are functions of the model structural parameters.
To estimate the model, the VARMA representation is augmented by adding four measurement
equations that link model variables to four key macroeconomic observable variables. In particular,
we use log dierence data of: real consumption, real output net of exports, total hours worked,



























^ yt   ^ yt 1
^ ct   ^ ct 1
^ ht   ^ ht 1




where  = log() is the common quarterly growth rate trend. Equations (57)-(58) form the state-
space representation of the model economy through which the structural parameters are estimated
in order to maximize the likelihood of observed data conditional to our model.
38C.2 Convergence diagnostics for selected parameters
Figures 9 and 10 plot the tests of convergence for our Markov chains. Following Gelman and
Brooks (1998) section 3, we employ three criteria of converge for each parameter (i.e. univariate
diagnostic):
Interval First column of gures 9 and 10. For each chain, take the 80% central interval of the draws
from the simulation, compute the length of the interval over the parameter value, and form
the mean of the interval lengths. This is the red line, i.e. the mean length of the within-chain
intervals, calculated and plotted for increasing number of draws n. Then, from the whole
set of draws gained from all the chains (280,000 draws), calculate the 80% central interval
length. This is the blue line, i.e. the length of total-sequence interval, plotted for increasing
number of draws n.
m2 Second column of gures 9 and 10. Repeat the same procedure, calculating the central second
moment instead of the interval. Thus, the red line is the mean of central second moments,
i.e. the mean of the variance of chains, while the blue line will be the total-sequence central
second moment.
m3 Third column of gures 9 and 10. Repeat the same procedure as in m2, calculating the
central third moment instead of the second moment.
Gelman and Brooks (1998) showed that in the three criteria the ratio between the two statistics
goes to 1 as convergence is approached. Thus, we expect the blue and the red lines to stabilize
and shrink to the same value for an increasing number of n on the x-axis.





































































Figure 9: Gelman-Brooke Test






































































Figure 10: Gelman-Brooke Test


















































Figure 11: Priors and Posteriors distributions. Priors are plotted in gray, Posteriors in black, and
the mode values computed to initiate the Chains are in dashed green.








































Figure 12: Priors and Posteriors distributions. Priors are plotted in gray, Posteriors in black, and
the mode values computed to initiate the Chains are in dashed green.
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